India's aviation industry promises huge growth potential due to a large and growing middle class population, favourable demographics, rapid economic growth, higher disposable incomes, and overall low air transport penetration levels of less than 3%. However, the Indian Airline Industry has been going through a turbulent phase over the past several years, facing multiple and prolonged difficulties through which carriers are continuously underperforming financially. After conducting a set of expert interviews backed by a statistical analysis of secondary data, this paper concludes that restrictions on foreign ownership, outdated regulatory policies and overtaxed fuel, overlain by industry wide overcapacity issues are the major contributing factors.
India -an economic powerhouse integrated with an enormous economically active population
India is a vast country, with a land frontier of 15,200 km and a coastline of 7500km, and is home to one-sixth of the world's population. Recently, it has been in the midst of an economic transformation -its nominal GDP surged to $1.7 trillion by 2010, up by 250% over ten years. Forecasts to 2015 reveal that India's GDP will increase by 120% to $3.7 trillion (IHS Global Insight, 2011) . British banking incumbent, Standard Chartered's research predicted that India will become the world's third largest economy by 2030, behind China and the US (The Economic Times, 2010) . Doganis (2010) argues that generally the demand for air travel is directly correlated to GDP by an elasticity of around 1.5 (i.e. a 4% increase in GDP, for example, is associated with a 6% increase in traffic). Therefore, the scope for India's growth in air transport is far reaching, as the country's strong GDP growth could trigger a high demand for air travel. The future of India's air travel looks bright, as total consumer expenditure (of Indian nationals) is estimated to be almost 15 times more than it was two decades ago (Euromonitor International, 2009 ).
Until the early 1990s, India was a relatively closed economy. Average import-weighed tariffs exceeded 80%, while more than 90% of tradable goods were protected by quantitative restrictions on imports, and foreign investment was subject to strict limitations (Chadha et al., 2003) . A study of India's aviation market by O'Connell and Williams (2006) discovered the same situation, finding that overall air transport enterprise had remained stagnant over many decades. Deep-rooted bureaucratic policies constrained any development and the state monopolised all aviation decisions. However, by the early 1990s, the country embarked on a series of major trade reforms, progressively cutting tariff-and non-tariff barriers, phasing out quantitative restrictions, and easing limitations on the entry of foreign investment through a liberalised policy framework that spanned the whole economy. India's government also initiated new aviation reforms that would provide a road map for a new aviation policy known as the 'Naresh Chandra', the aim of which was to deliver fast track reforms. Even though India today can still be considered a heavily protected economy on many levels, progressive liberalisation has produced remarkable results. The country's recent openness has tripled international trade since the late 1980s, and its economy has been expanding at an astounding pace, second only to China who embarked on reforms earlier (World Bank, 2008) . Marelli et al (2011) use a measure of 'Openness' (sum of exports and imports divided by total GDP) to demonstrate the earlier and then later gains made by both China and India respectively in trade liberalisation with China's degree of openness rising from around 14% to 60% since 1980 while India's openness grew from around 12%-40% over the same period with the largest gains being observed more recently.
India is the world's second most populous nation in the world, registering over 1.2 billion inhabitants in 2010, which represents about 17.3% of the total world population. Its population has increased by 181 million during the decade 2001-2011, which is slightly lower than the population of Brazil -the fifth most populous in the world (Census of India, 2011). According to a report by India's Defence and Security (2010) , the country's dependent population 1 is decreasing and the percent of total active population 2 is increasing. Table 1 gives a snapshot of India's demographic indicators from 1995 to 2030. It shows that over 64% of India's population was of working age 3 in 2010, which is the highest in the world, and by 2030, it is set to mature further to almost 70%, which
gives it an edge over other developing and developed nations. Meanwhile, the Airbus Global Market Forecast (2011) speculated that around 40% of the Indian population will live in cities by 2030, up considerably from the 28% that do so today. Indeed, the country's massive workforce is seen as one of its greatest resources and could positively trigger a socio-economic boom 4 for India, which will positively impact the air transport industry.
1 Total population within age groups of 0-14 and older than 65 years of age 2 Total population between age group 14-64 3 India had a median age of 25.3 years in 2010. 4 The growth of the middle class and the economic growth of India are in a virtuous cycle. Rising incomes lead to more consumption, which in turn leads to higher economic growth, then more employment opportunities and subsequently higher wages and the circle starts again. provided by Euromonitor, Gini Index for India, the higher income segments are rising relatively faster than the lower ones, without increasing the poverty of the country. Analysis from Airbus Global Market Forecast (2011) indicates that Indian citizens currently make an average of just 0.1 air trips per year compared with 2.2 times in the U.S., and it is very apparent that there exists an enormous potential for air travel in India, as consumers begin switching some of their discretionary income to this area either as new travellers or as travellers previously limited to using the slower, more highly congested rail network.
An introduction to the Indian air transport industry and an insight into the core underlying difficulties that are hindering its financial performance
The Indian air transport market is currently one the fastest growing markets in the world.
After nationalisation in 1953, the air transport industry experienced a monopoly by the national carriers until the early 1990s. Increasing pressure for market liberalisation, coupled with the inefficiency of the state-owned carriers led to the repeal of the 1953 Air
Corporations Act by the early 1990s. In 1992, the government took the first step to open up the domestic market by allowing private carriers to operate domestic flights. However, these start-up carriers had to comply with strict traffic allocation rules and were legislated to operate for 5 years in the domestic market before being allowed to serve the international destinations. Since most of the start-ups began operations almost at the same time, it was difficult for them to outperform each other financially and breakeven, as they were competing head-to-head with each other on almost all routes. Subsequently, the Indian market underwent three major consolidations. Table 2 shows Indian carriers incurred an average net loss in all of the observed years in the period 2006-2011. booming economy 7 , demand for dedicated air freight services, as well as belly cargo (freight carried in aircraft holds on scheduled passenger services) has increased significantly in recent years. The Airports Authority of India (AAI) forecasts the growth of international and domestic cargo to be handled by Indian airports at 15% through to 2012-13, with more long-term growth of around 12% (Aviation Outlook, 2011).
However, despite such strong growth figures, all the mainline Indian carriers have recorded huge systemic losses over recent years (with the exception of IndiGo).
Cumulative losses for the period between 2006 and 2011 amounted to around $6.7
billion, as shown in Table 2 , while losses for 2011-12 are estimated to be more than $2 billion, and while the total debt load of Indian based carriers has escalated to $20 billion (Reuters, 2012; Govindasamy, July 2012) . These endemic losses are the result of deep rooted problems within the Indian aviation system. This paper seeks to uncover these issues with the help of a number of interviews, which were overlain by a necessary Three core underlying difficulties were uncovered in the research, and these were:
Government regulations and policies; taxation policies on aviation fuel; and overcapacity in the domestic market -each of which will be assessed in detail.
7 India's software industry is revolutionising the economy. In 2010, the sector grew by 19%, generating $76 billion in revenues and is forecast to generate $225 billion by 2020. A report entitled IT-BPO Sector in India: Strategic Review 2011 published by the National Association of Software Services Companies stated that the IT industry contributes 26% to total Indian exports. Other high-tech industries such as Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals are also growing at double digit rates collectively producing revenues worth $16 billion in 2010 (Nasscom, 2011) .
Reasons behind recent poor performance of India's home carriers

Government regulations and policies
Although the Indian market witnessed two phases of liberalisation, past literature on the Indian airline industry and expert opinions from the interviews reveal the fact that the market is still partially regulated by some odd policies. According to the interview respondents, these odd policies have a negative impact on the carriers serving the market, and it needs further liberalisation in order to facilitate the strong growth predictions that lie ahead. This requires the government to reconsider certain restrictive policies such as its Ownership and Control policy in the civil aviation sector, its Taxation policy, and a
proper and standardised framework for bilateral Air Service Agreements.
The Indian government allows only 49% equity participation in the Indian carriers as Foreign Direct Investment by non-airline entities. The most important constraint of this policy is that foreign carriers are not allowed to hold any equity capitalisation in India's airlines unless owned by Indian non-nationals, in which case 100% of India's home carriers could be bought. By contrast international ownership restrictions range from 25%
in the US to 49% in the European Union though this time without such a nationality clause preventing foreign investment. The need for lifting this restriction arose as Indian carriers were struggling with mounting losses year after year (see Table 2 ), while they also faced a liquidity crunch coupled with mounting debts. With a wide scope for growth and development in the market, the players found themselves short of cash flows, which is an essential ingredient for longevity and growth in an airline's asset base. airport exclusivity; the number of airlines allowed to operate; and pricing. Table 3 summarises the key characteristics of the ASAs governing the top five international
Origin/Destination markets to/from India. In this environment, foreign carriers found it difficult to gain market share when operating to India -for example, in the Saudi Arabia to India country pair, Saudi Arabian Airlines lost traction as it had 49% market share in 2003, but by 2011 it had reduced to 44%, while the overall traffic increased by 80%, as shown in Figure 4a , which significantly favoured Indian carriers. Similarly, in the restricted India to Nepal market, the Indian carrier share of total traffic grew at a time when total traffic grew more modestly (by just 11% respectively), as shown in Figure 4b . Conversely, in markets where most or all of the capacity restrictions were lifted, the strongest traffic growth can be observed, but a higher proportion of the total market share was provided by foreign carriers such as the India to UAE country pair, as shown in Figure 4c . The 19% reduction in the Indian carrier market share coincided with a period in which traffic grew by 108%, suggesting that the increased number of foreign carrier services has had a stimulatory effect after the lifting of India-UAE bilateral restrictions in 2004. These results imply an interesting trade-off for policy-makers. If capacity restrictions within India's ASA's are removed, international traffic is generally stimulated -but at the same time, home carriers lose out in terms of market presence, and a growing number of passengers switch to providers with the more attractive widespread route networks and frequencies. In contrast, market position for home carriers can be maintained in markets with more capacity restrictions, but a lack of ownership rights coupled with limited incentives to increase productivity, together with a laissez-faire environment to set one's own fares, will negatively impact the number of passengers uplifted and can derail business/tourism investments.
Thus two permutations exist: firstly, capacity restrictions can continue to be relaxed in these restricted country-pairs, but Indian incumbents must become much more competitive and react more quickly to market conditions -which to date has not occurred and is unlikely to occur in the near future; secondly, capacity restrictions can remain in place so that this will give the home carriers more time to make internal changes to ramp up productivity, efficiencies, competitiveness and brand development, and time to lobby the Government to make infrastructural changes to the countries airports 11 , navigational systems and regulatory landscape -with the interviewees strongly favouring the latter approach. Figure 5 . However, for four of the seven observed years in this period, Jet Airways operated at an overall loss (see Table 2 ), suggesting that the concurrent downward pressure on yields (US$0.08-0.06 cents per RPK) does not compensate for the cost of supplying that additional capacity. Over two-thirds of the Jet Airways capacity is now generated by international operations, aided by the airline's 'scissor' hub in Brussels with daily flights arriving from India (Chennai, Delhi and Mumbai) and flying across the Atlantic to Newark, New York JFK and Toronto. All routes are operated with 226-seat A330s which are all scheduled to arrive in Brussels at 07:50 in the morning. All six aircraft then depart at just after 10:00 allowing a good two hours for connections between flights to be made. Jet Airways is one of the world's only carriers that operate this type of hub activity, and this unique strategy is strongly contributing to its exponential growth profile. 
Taxation policy on aviation fuel
Fuel is the largest single cost item for the global airline industry, and in 2010, it represented 26% of an airline's operating cost -globally, the fuel expense for carriers has increased five fold since 2003 (IATA, 2012 . However, the cost of fuel in India is one of the biggest burdens for home carriers, as it constitutes around 45% to 50% of the total operational costs for carriers, which is well in excess of the global average -the cost of fuel in India is around 50-70% higher than the average international benchmarks • The oil companies charge a 20% add-on to the Refinery Transfer Price (RTP) as import parity.
• In addition to this, oil companies include a 16% to 49% add-on towards marketing margins and contingencies on the RTP. This add-on varies between cities and averages out at around 21%.
• On the RTP, the Central Government levies an excise duty of 8%. On the resultant price, the various State Governments levy a local sales tax ranging from 4% to 39%, which, on average, works out at 25% nationwide.
• Thus, the total government levies sum up to an additional 35% beyond the import parity price, making the price of ATF in India up to 60% to 70% higher than international benchmarks. standardise the ATF price for domestic operations so that it is aligned with international market prices, it would save the industry around US$624 million, which in turn would raise operating profits by about 25%. The carriers also complained that high ATF taxes around the country not only affect the financial health of the carrier, but also make it unattractive for equity capital and debt financing.
Overcapacity in the domestic market
Serious overcapacity issues began to emerge after the second phase of liberalisation, as enormous volumes of capacity were added to the domestic market, especially by the new entrant carriers 14 . Analysis reveals that prior to this second phase (pre 2004), annual capacity growth was averaging at 7%, but from 2005 and 2007, it increased exponentially at a annual rate of 39% -and by 2008, capacity had doubled from its position three years earlier, as a direct result of the entry of a large number of new entrant carriers within a short timeframe (see Figure 7) . To exacerbate the overcapacity issues, passenger traffic began to decline from 2007, as a result of the global economic slowdown as Indian carriers continued to furnish capacity, which created a significant gap between the market forces of supply and demand, as shown in Figure 7 . By 2006-07, the total domestic capacity was around 70 million seats, while the total number of passenger carried was only 44 million, and this type of situation continued over the following years, whereby capacity was growing at a faster pace than the number of passengers that were being transported 15 . The new entrants accounted for over 80% of the total capacity that was added, while Air Deccan and Kingfisher alone were re reported that these carriers were profitable business entity that was sustainable.
government on deploying capacity in the market, the carriers went on adding aircraft at a rate of 6-6.5 per month during the period 2006 ideal to absorb demand growth The interviewees also expressed their concerns about the cut was being rigorously exercised by the market dynamics, as they had captured 41% by January 2011 against 34% in the corresponding period two years earlier. As a result of excess supply, the airlines had to drop fares signi in order to increase load factors. 
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The new entrants accounted for over 80% of the total capacity that was added, while Air Deccan and Kingfisher alone were responsible for 50%. The interviewee respondents reported that these carriers were far too focused on market penetration, rather than on achieving a profitable business entity that was sustainable. Since there were no restrictions from the oying capacity in the market, the carriers went on adding aircraft at a rate of s also expressed their concerns about the cut-throat domestic ticket pricing that exercised by the low cost carriers, which was having a big impact on the as they had captured 41% by January 2011 against 34% in the corresponding As a result of excess supply, the airlines had to drop fares signi order to increase load factors. Most of the respondents (except those at IndiGo) stressed that fares must rise or the industry could face meltdown, and they hypothesised on re-regulating the market in order to normalise pricing. Figure 9 reinforces the dilemma facing India's carriers on a key trunk route between Mumbai and Delhi, on which every carrier operates with high frequency 16 . It shows that despite consistent rises in passenger numbers, the total revenue was sharply declining, due to a significant reduction in the average fare on the route, and this was representative for numerous city pairs throughout mainland India. an upward swing of improved year-on-year yields, as can be observed in Figure 10 . 17 In early 2012, Air India is waiting for a cash injection of about $1 billion from the Government, half of which will settle dues with oil companies, while over 20% is ear tagged for unpaid airport charges. This bailout will not solve the bigger issues that are looming in the Indian air transport market (Govindasamy, May 2012) . To gain a deeper insight into the evolving dynamics of market share and accompanying yield, which appear to be the key constituents of the domestic market, further analysis that the new entrant low cost carriers such as IndiGo (6E) and SpiceJet (SG) have down yields from an average of US$0.15 cents per RPK in 2005 to just as shown in Figure 11 . This type of 'distressed with low cost carriers, as they continue to encroach on the short haul markets right across the globe. These business models have enshrined the concept of 'low cost' in which culminates in reducing each unit of cost taff and equipment productivity 18 , which in-turn allows them to reduce fares low cost carriers have now become firmly embedded in the Indian landscape ons to counteract the problems emanating from these the largest share of domestic passenger traffic in India average yield as low as US$0.04 cents per RPK his remains one of the greatest challenges that will evolve into IndiGo, has 102 employees per aircraft, while Air India has around 4.7 times this amount. which has the ability to inflict great damage to the traditional Indian carriers, and like many other issues, there are no clear strategies to address and resolve these concerns. 
Conclusion
India's economy is surging and is set to become the world's third largest by 2030. It is one of the G-20 major economies. India is often seen by most economists as a rising economic superpower and is believed to play a major role in the global economy in the 21st century. However, air travel penetration in India remains among the lowest in the world; in fact, air travel penetration in India is less than half of that in China, where people take 0.2 trips per person per year, indicating strong long term growth potential.
India's aviation industry promises huge growth due to a large and growing middle class population, favourable demographics, rapid economic growth, and the rising aspirations of the middle class, whose discretionary income will be partially spent on air travel. The industry has grown at a 16% CAGR in passenger traffic terms over the past decade.
However, during this time, the landscape of Indian aviation has changed considerably over the last decade, as a wave of consolidation in the mid 2000's narrowed the playing field to just seven carriers, six of whom are severely underperforming financially, even though traffic has increased exponentially. Aircraft manufacturer forecasts predict that demand will continue to surge over the next twenty years as more Indians switch to air travel. However, the Indian Aviation Industry has been going through a turbulent phase over the past several years, facing multiple and prolonged difficulties through which carriers are continuously underperforming financially. An investigation was conducted in order to uncover the root causes that underpin these endemic financial losses that are striking the Indian carriers through interviews with high ranking airline personnel, which was overlain by a necessary content analysis of the literature for the purposes of triangulation.
Three core difficulties emanated from the research. The first major issue was government regulations and policies which prohibit foreign airlines to invest in Indian carriers, which is a common strategy that is practiced right across the globe. This capital injection would provide the catalyst for growth and development, together with global expertise and best industry practices. The excessive taxes that are levied on India's carriers are significantly impacting overall yields, as fares are lowered in order to make trips more attractive for the prospective traveller. Since the Indian market is predominantly driven by its underlying economic development, growth in air travel is inevitable. To enhance this growth, it is likely that any remaining restricted international markets will be liberalised and a standard set of regulations will be set for the next decade by the Government.
However, Indian carriers are unprepared for this inevitable consequence and will be overpowered by stronger foreign airlines, who will continue to encroach and gain dominance in India. It is clear that home carriers need more time to make strategic internal changes to ramp up productivity, efficiencies, competitiveness and brand development before the skies are further opened to more competition. A second major difficulty experienced by the home carriers was the excessive tax on fuel, as this constitutes an average of almost fifty percent of the cost structure, which is well in excess of the global average. The problems here are two-fold as there is a clear lack of regulation over a standardised price, and there is strong evidence of bureaucratic interference as many stakeholders are allowed into the supply chain, all of whom add levies which escalate the price. The final concern facing India's home carriers is overcapacity, as seat supply far outweighs passenger demand on domestic services. This has severely distressed overall yields and has significantly contributed to the financial underperformance of almost all of the domiciled airlines in India, mainly triggered by new low cost carrier entrants, whose business model works very favourably in such a market. India's traditional network carriers must develop their hub and spoke platform, whereby domestic traffic is channelled through fortress hub airports to then be transported onwards into international markets via their own network or through that of a synergised partner.
